Regulations urge police to handle mass protests with care
11 December 2007CLB has translated in full a set of internal regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Security that provide detailed guidelines for local police in handling the increasing number of public protests, known as "collective incidents," by citizens across China.
There has been a well-documented clampdown on public protests over the last few months, as the authorities seek to create as positive an image of China as possible during the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008. Moreover, as demonstrated by the recent violent attacks by thugs on a labour rights group in Shenzhen, police and local authorities have failed to adequately protect those seeking to safeguard and promote the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens.
According to internal regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Security in April 2000, police have a clear responsibility to "protect the lawful rights and interests of the people" when engaged in legitimate protest, and China Labour Bulletin urges the authorities to take this responsibility extremely seriously, and to demonstrate to the outside world that China really is striving to create a harmonious society.
The regulations, translated here in full, we believe for the first time, explain in great detail how police and local authorities should handle public protests and demonstrations, officially known as "collective incidents," the majority of which over the last decade have arisen from labour disputes. While in some ways signaling a welcome shift in official policy away from repressive and heavy-handed tactics in dealing with social protest, these regulations continue to provide the police with clear license and authority to crack down harshly on citizens' freedom of association and expression.
According to the regulations, police should exercise restraint and caution when dealing with strikes and peaceful demonstrations by workers, and local government officials working with the police should use "guidance and persuasion" as their primary methods of crowd dispersal.
However, the ministry also urges its officers to: "Strengthen intelligence and information-gathering work," especially when collective incidents "have been fanned by hostile elements who have meddled in and exploited conflicts among different social groups," and then "immediately expose and crack down on the perpetrators." Police, especially during times of severe social tension or when major policy initiatives are to be announced, are encouraged to "make full use of various overt and covert methods to investigate factors undermining social stability, and carry out advance analysis when a collective incident is predictable, to forestall its occurrence."
The 5 April 2000 Circular from the Ministry of Public Security that accompanied and explained the new regulations is broadly in line with central government policy, which now classifies workers' protests as essentially non-political in nature, arising from tensions engendered by the rapid pace of social and economic change in China.
Section Four of the circular clearly states:
In incidents arising from collective appeals to authorities, petitions, sit-ins, and strikes among workers, students and tradespeople or consumers, the Public Security authorities shall work with the local Party and government leaderships and competent authorities and units, and take conflict-resolution measures, preventing a situation from worsening or growing in scale. Police strength must always be used with caution, as should weapons and other police tools, and coercive measures. In cases where collective incidents that affect public order are triggered by problems involving collective interests, such as redundancies, lack of daily income, arrears in wages and pension benefits, forced relocations, exploitation of rural migrants, and unauthorized fee-collecting, fining, resource allocation and fund-raising, the Public Security authorities should concentrate on upholding general order, protecting the lawful rights and interests of the people, and supporting official conflict-resolution efforts, and avoid taking unwarranted coercive measures, even if a minority resort to extreme words and actions, as long as there is no serious threat to transportation and public order.
Only when incidents escalate, and when:
Hostile elements attack party or government organizations or key units, lie in front of vehicles, obstruct transportation, or cause other disturbances, or commit criminal actions such as beating, smashing, looting or burning property, Public Security authorities shall boldly uphold the law, stability, and the interests of the State and people, and resolutely take the necessary measures within the law.
A key aspect of the regulations is the repeated stipulation that local police should work closely with other local government and Party agencies to achieve a peaceful resolution of protests. As CLB points out in our research report on the workers' movement from 2005-06, many local governments have adopted a conciliatory approach to workers' protests. For example, when workers at Uniden Corporation in Shenzhen went on strike in April 2005 demanding the establishment of a union, the Labour and Social Security Bureau in Shenzhen's Bao'an District organized a labour-management coordination team to go into the factory and encourage the company to improve the working and living conditions of its workers. As a result, the company completely renovated the water system in the employee dormitory to guarantee a supply of hot water, added over 100 cell phone chargers for employees, and increased the number of food-serving windows in the employee cafeteria from nine to 14. Moreover, the workers' demand to establish a union was eventually met, although management was allowed to nominate and select union representatives.
However, we have also documented numerous incidents in which police and local government failed to exercise caution, and forcibly broke up protests, arresting and seriously injuring workers in the process. The following are just three examples from our workers' movement (2005-06) research report (avaible in Chinese here):
- From the morning of 3 June until the afternoon of 8 June 2005, 3,000 workers at the Futai Wool Knitting Factory in Guangdong went on strike over low wages. The local authorities mobilized over 300 police officers to forcibly disperse the striking workers, firing tear gas at them and arresting over 20 people.
- On 7 October 2005, several hundred police officers took into custody workers' representatives who were protesting at the factory gates of the Chongqing Special Steel Plant. More than 20 workers and their family members were injured during the conflict.
- On 29 September 2005, over 100 workers from the Zhiye Shoe Factory in Guangzhou took to the streets in protest, demanding that the factory pay the back wages owed them. The local government dispatched numerous police vehicles and about one hundred police officers to disperse the workers. Six workers were later taken into custody.
Importantly, the Regulations permit and encourage, local police to seal off collective incidents, check the identity of those present, and make sure local media does not have access to the scene. The Regulations also state that all information must be referred to the local or higher levels of government or the Party before being disseminated to the general public. According to Article 10, Sections 5-6, police should:
Check the identification documents of all those present at the scene, and check articles carried by suspicious persons; prevent the recording of sound or images, taking of photographs, and interviewing or reporting activities at the scene of the disturbance by any person who has not been approved by officials in command. Information relating to a collective incident that must be made public shall first be reported to the Party committee or government at the county or municipal level or higher levels for examination and approval, and should then be reported to and approved by the higher-level Party committee and [local] government affected before being released in the appropriate format. Major or sensitive incidents must be reported to the Party Central Committee and the State Council and made public only after their approval.
In addition, in a sweeping restriction on the freedom of expression, Article 11, Section 5, states: "dangerous items, and tools, banners, leaflets and other items for illegal propaganda and incitement purposes shall be confiscated, and those carrying them handled according to the law."
As CLB has documented on numerous occasions this year, these tactics are being regularly employed by local governments and police across the country in a bid to keep news of "collective incidents" from reaching the outside world. For example, on 29 June 2007, more than 3,000 workers at the giant Shuangma Cement Plant in Mianyang, Sichuan Province, downed tools and went on strike to protest against the company's proposed severance package. The response of management and local government to the strike was to seal off the town, surround the plant with police and remove all internet postings related to the dispute. Likewise when news emerged that the entire workforce of the Jinzhou bus company in Liaoning had gone on strike on 19 July, bringing the town to a standstill, the authorities did not address the drivers' concerns over pay and privatization but merely blocked all news related to the strike.
Finally, Article 16 of the Regulations states:
In the event that Public Security organs handling a collective incident should violate laws or regulations or these Regulations with serious consequences, the administrative and legal responsibility of the cadres and officials directly responsible shall be investigated, as circumstances require.
However, this is very much a "boilerplate" provision, as found in most of China's laws and regulations nowadays, and the police still routinely operate with much less accountability than other government agencies.