China's central government carried out an unprecedented review and revamping of coal mine safety regulations in 2005, in which it raised the standards required of national work safety supervisory bodies, closed mines around the country that did not have adequate safety provision, required government officials who had invested in coal mines to sell their holdings, and punished officials and mine owners found responsible for major mining accidents.

Despite these efforts, the number of major coal mine accidents – defined as those in which more than ten people died – reached a new peak during 2005. There were 58 such accidents, as compared with 41 in 2004; and the number of miners killed in those accidents totaled 1,739, as compared with 979 in 2004. These are increases of 41.5 percent and 77.6 percent respectively. The facts clearly show that government measures to address the coalmine safety problem have been woefully inadequate. What are the reasons for this?

In a new report on China's coal mining safety management policies, CLB points out that a serious conflict has arisen between the voracious market demand for coal and the effective implementation of government reforms aimed at improving coal mine safety. By simply closing unsafe coal mines when the market demand for coal remains high, the government in effect ensures that the remaining mines will end up operating at well above their safe production capacity, which in turn leads to fresh mining disasters. In other words, government policy is caught in a vicious cycle of its own making. Another fundamental problem is the widespread collusion between local government officials and mine owners, which further hinders mine safety policy implementation.

In this report, CLB addresses the mine safety problem from a new angle – the value of the coal miner's life – and investigates what should be the real basis of coal mine safety management policies. CLB believes that the main weakness in current government policies on coal mine safety is that they place insufficient value on miners' lives. What is required is an effective workers' organisation – either miners' health and safety committees, or active trade unions in the mines – which would break down, from the inside, the 'fortress mentality' that officials and mine owners have set up to protect their own interests.

The report is laid out in three parts. In the first, we analyse the data on coal mine accidents in China and give a summary of the central government's policies and measures to prevent coal mine accidents. The second part considers the reasons why government policies have failed, starting from the economic and social realities in China today. The third section looks at China's coal mining accidents from a workers' rights point of view and emphasizes the need for coal miners to play an active role in monitoring their own safety underground. Lastly, CLB provides a series of recommendations on how to reduce and halt accidents in the country's coal mines.

The report is currently being translated into English. The full report is available in simplified Chinese characters on our website at the following address:

http://big5.clb.org.hk/fs/view/bloody_coal_(final).pdf

16 March 2006

For Details of Important Correction to Data that appeared in Previously Released Version of above document, see: http://www.clb.org.hk/public/contents/news?revision%5fid=38289&item%5fid=37310